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	<title>Comments on: Il ritrattamento del combustibile nucleare senza produrre plutonio puro?</title>
	<link>http://www.archivionucleare.com/index.php/2006/01/28/ritrattamento-combustibile-nucleare-plutonio-puro/</link>
	<description>raccolta di news sul nucleare</description>
	<pubDate>Thu, 17 May 2012 17:20:39 +0000</pubDate>
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 		<title>Comment on Il ritrattamento del combustibile nucleare senza produrre plutonio puro? by: G.A.</title>
		<link>http://www.archivionucleare.com/index.php/2006/01/28/ritrattamento-combustibile-nucleare-plutonio-puro/#comment-229</link>
		<pubDate>Tue, 14 Mar 2006 13:55:12 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid>http://www.archivionucleare.com/index.php/2006/01/28/ritrattamento-combustibile-nucleare-plutonio-puro/#comment-229</guid>
					<description>Una recente ricerca del Dipartimento per l'Energia statunitense sconfessa la notizia dell'ANSA.

&quot;U.S. Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing Initiative, 
Department of Energy Research Shows Technology Does Not Reduce Risks of Nuclear Proliferation and Terrorism&quot;

Estratto: 

&quot;It is important to understand that Department of Energy (DOE) claims these technologies are &quot;proliferation resistant&quot; compared with the reprocessing technology in use today in some other countriesâ€”the so-called PUREX process, which separates the plutonium from all the other elements in the spent fuel. The DOE is not comparing it to the current practice in the U.S. of direct disposal of spent fuel. None of the DOE's proposed reprocessing technologies would be nearly as resistant to proliferation or terrorist theft as a fuel cycle in which the spent fuel is stored without reprocessing and disposed of in a geologic repository.&quot;

http://www.ucsusa.org/global_security/nuclear_terrorism/doe_proliferation_resistance.html

(copiare le due righe precedenti come una sola riga)

Fonte  Originale:  Union of Concerned Scientists

Riportata da: Rete Europea dei Giovani per il Disarmo Nucleare</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[	<p>Una recente ricerca del Dipartimento per l&#8217;Energia statunitense sconfessa la notizia dell&#8217;ANSA.</p>
	<p>&#8220;U.S. Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing Initiative,<br />
Department of Energy Research Shows Technology Does Not Reduce Risks of Nuclear Proliferation and Terrorism&#8221;</p>
	<p>Estratto: </p>
	<p>&#8220;It is important to understand that Department of Energy (DOE) claims these technologies are &#8220;proliferation resistant&#8221; compared with the reprocessing technology in use today in some other countriesâ€”the so-called PUREX process, which separates the plutonium from all the other elements in the spent fuel. The DOE is not comparing it to the current practice in the U.S. of direct disposal of spent fuel. None of the DOE&#8217;s proposed reprocessing technologies would be nearly as resistant to proliferation or terrorist theft as a fuel cycle in which the spent fuel is stored without reprocessing and disposed of in a geologic repository.&#8221;</p>
	<p><a href='http://www.ucsusa.org/global_security/nuclear_terrorism/doe_proliferation_resistance.html' rel="nofollow" target="_blank">ucsusa.org/global_security/nuclear_terrorism/doe_proliferati...</a></p>
	<p>(copiare le due righe precedenti come una sola riga)</p>
	<p>Fonte  Originale:  Union of Concerned Scientists</p>
	<p>Riportata da: Rete Europea dei Giovani per il Disarmo Nucleare
</p>
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